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THE PLAYWRIGHT LICENSING ANTITRUST
INITIATIVE ACT: EMPOWERING THE
"STARVING ARTIST" THROUGH THE
CONVERGENCE OF COPYRIGHT, LABOR, AND
ANTITRUST POLICIES
I INTRODUCTION
In February 2005, Representative

Howard Coble (R-NC)

sponsored the Playwright Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act
(hereinafter "PLAI").' Along with cosponsors John Conyers, Jr.
(D-MI), Barney Frank (D-MA), and Henry Hyde (R-IL), Coble
introduced the PLAI to the House Judiciary Committee.2 Several
different versions of the bill have been introduced in the House

and Senate since 2001, but it has yet to be put to a vote.'
The PLAI proposes to amend antitrust laws to enable
playwrights to bargain collectively to create a new standard form

1. Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2005, H.R. 532, 109th
Cong. (2005).
2. H.R. 532.
3. See id (sponsored by Howard Coble (R-NC), cosponsored by John
Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), Barney Frank (D-MA), Henry Hyde (R-IL)); Playwrights
Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, H.R. 4615, 108th Cong. (2004)
(sponsored by Howard Coble (R-NC), cosponsored by John Conyers, Jr. (DMI), Barney Frank (D-MA), Henry Hyde (R-IL)); Playwrights Licensing
Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349, 108th Cong. (2004) (sponsored by
Orin Hatch (R-UT), cosponsored by Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)); Playwrights
Licensing Relief Act of 2002, S. 2082, 107th Cong. (2002) (sponsored by Orin
Hatch (R-UT), cosponsored by Charles Schumer (D-NY)); Fair Play for
Playwrights Act of 2001, H.R. 3543, 107th Cong. (2001) (sponsored by Henry
Hyde (R-IL), cosponsored by Barney Frank (D-MA)). I would speculate that
the reason it seems to die in committee each year is the rather esoteric scope of
the bill.
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contract for licensing their plays to producers.'
The Dramatist
Guild of America (hereinafter "the Guild"), an association of
playwrights in the United States, has employed a standard form
contract for many years, which has caused various controversies in
the courts. Producers allege that this contract is a violation of
antitrust laws. Both proponents and opponents of the PLAI agree
that the Guild's standard form contract is extremely outdated.
However, the Guild is unable to update the contract because case
precedent has held the contract, even in its outdated form, to be a
restraint of trade.6 The PLAI would allow the Guild to update the
standard form contract without violating federal antitrust law.
Part II of this article sets forth the background information
necessary to understand the impact of the proposed legislation.
First, it discusses the federal laws implicated by the PLAI. Next, it
outlines the case precedent which has pushed the Guild to lobby
for this legislation. Finally, it describes a comparable piece of
state legislation that affects the medical industry.
Part III sets forth the legislative history of the PLAI.
It
discusses the pending legislation, including Senate testimony, to
give a well-rounded explanation of the reasons behind the bill.
Part IV argues that although this piece of legislation may not be
in conformity with the literal language of the applicable statutes, it
does further the basic policies behind them. First it addresses
copyright law, then labor law, and finally antitrust law. An
analysis of the relevant cases follows and the similarities between
the state legislation in the medical industry and the PLAI is also
explored.
Part V sets forth some suggestions on how to obtain the passage
of this legislation. Specifically, it recommends that the Guild
4. H.R. 532.
5. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975); Ring v.
Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945); Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F. Supp.
555 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers,
Inc., 1975 WL 957 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975).
6. Ring, 148 F.2d at 650 (citing e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273
U.S. 392 (1970), explaining that under the Sherman Act, a contract covering a
large part of an industry will be void and illegal if it contains various restrictive
agreements, which when combined constitute a restraint of trade). As such, the
contract is not currently used by the Guild.
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concentrate on the specific policies fulfilled by the PLAI, and that
lobbying efforts be redirected towards state government.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Applicable FederalLaw
This article addresses three different areas of law: Copyright
law, labor law, and antitrust law. The PLAI affects all three of
these areas and, as this article will argue, also promotes the
policies behind them.
1. Copyright Law
The United States Constitution recognizes the protection of
copyrights "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."7
Copyright law addresses two competing interests: the interests of
authors in the fruits of their labor on the one hand, and on the
other, the interest of the public in ultimately claiming free access
to the materials "essential to the development of society."8 In
some cases, Congress and the courts reconcile these two
competing interests through statistical data or on the basis of
theory, and in others, on the basis of an "informed hunch." 9 But
the point of decision in all of the cases is the same: "[c]opyright
law's overarching ambition to encourage the widest possible
production and dissemination of literary and artistic works.°
2. LaborLaw
The area of law known as "Labor Law" was codified by the
7. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.

8. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,

NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §

1.05[D] (2006).
9. 1 Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT § 1.14.2 (2d ed. 2004).
10. Id.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

3

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

398

DEPAULJ.ART &ENT. LAW

[Vol. XVI:395

National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA")." The NLRA
states:
The denial by some employers of the right of
employees to organize and the refusal by some
employers to accept the procedures of collective
bargaining... [has] the intent or necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce.... It is hereby

declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce .... 12
The NLRA encourages the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and protects the exercise of workers' freedom of
association. 3 It does this by promoting "self-organization ... for

the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of [the
workers'] employment or other mutual aid or protection."' 4
Section 153 of the Act created the National Labor Relations
Board to adjudicate cases that fall within the scope of the NLRA. 5
3. Antitrust Law
Antitrust law primarily addresses the economic harms caused by
various restraints of trade, including price-fixing and monopolies. 6
It was codified in the Sherman Antitrust Act (hereinafter "Sherman
Act"), which states, "Every contract... or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce... is declared to be illegal.17
Section 17 of the Sherman Act amended the antitrust laws,
making them inapplicable to labor organizations (consistent with
the NLRA):

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
Id. § 151.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 153.
See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
Id. § 1.
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The labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce. Nothing contained in the
antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or
horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purpose of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof;
nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws. 8
Various non-economic concerns have been recognized as social
policy behind the antitrust laws. 9 Encompassed in those social
policies are concerns that competitors be treated fairly; concerns
with the dispersion of social power; and concerns with the
promotion of equal opportunity.2" Debates on the Congressional
intent behind the Sherman Act show that "Congress condemned..
•monopolies because they had enough power to raise prices and
'unfairly' extract wealth from consumers ... ""
B. Applicable Case Precedent
Copyright, labor, and antitrust laws converge in several cases
involving collective bargaining by trade associations in the
entertainment industry.22 The courts have held that when it comes
18. Id § 17 (sometimes referred to as Section 17 of the Sherman Act, other
times referred to as the Clayton Act. In Ring v. Spina, it is referred to as the
former, and so for the purposes of this article, and in the interests of consistency,
it will continue to be referred to as Section 17 of the Sherman Act).
19. The Sedona Conference Working Group on the Role of Economics in
Antitrust, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 26 (2005).
20. Id.
21. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the OriginalandPrimary Concern
of Antitrust: The Efficiency InterpretationChallenged,34 HASTINGs L.J. 65, 93
(1982) (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890)).
22. See cases cited supra note 5.
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to licensing agreements (copyright law), only certain associations
will be categorized as labor unions (labor law). 3 If associations
are not deemed labor unions, the Sherman Act prohibits them from
collectively negotiating the terms of licensing agreements
(antitrust law).2
1. Ring v. Spina
The Ring saga began in 1945, when the Second Circuit
considered the issue of whether an association of playwrights
could collectively decide the terms of a standard form contract for
licensing agreements.2 5 After clarification of that issue, the case
was remanded to the district court for an assessment of damages.2 6
That decision was later appealed in the Second Circuit again.27
The defendants in Ring were the authors of a play, their agent,
and the Guild.28 At issue in the case was the Guild's Minimum
Basic Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement"), which a producer or
manager must sign before any members of the Guild may license
their works to that producer or manager.29 The Agreement fixes
the minimum terms of the license concerning the pricing of
advances and royalties." It also limits contracts to those made
under its terms and to those managers and members who are in
good standing with the Guild.3 Furthermore, it provides for the
adjudication of all disputes through arbitration.32
The plaintiff was a producer who had assumed the rights of
another producer. The previous producer had already entered into
a Production Contract (hereinafter "Contract") with the authors

23. Bernstein, 517 F.2d 976; Julien, 1975 WL 957.
24. Bernstein, 517 F.2d 976; Ring, 148 F.2d 647; Barr, 573 F. Supp. 555.
25. Ring, 148 F.2d 647.
26. Ring v. Spina, 84 F.Supp. 403, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), modified sub nom.
Ring v. Author's League of America, Inc. 186 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1951).
27. Ring v. Author's League of America, Inc., 186 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1951).
28. Ring, 148 F.2d at 649.
29. id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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that was subject to the provisions of the Agreement. 3 The plaintiff
maintained that he was coerced into the rescission of the Contract
put in place for the original producer, and had agreed to accept the
terms of the Agreement as the sole governing document, merely to
protect his initial investment of $50,000. 3"
After the plaintiff had invested an additional $75,000, a dispute
arose over changes he wanted to make to the play.35 The
defendants asserted that the plaintiff had breached the Agreement
by altering the work without their consent, and considered the
contract terminated.36 The play was forced to close and the authors
requested arbitration pursuant to the Agreement's arbitration
clause.3 7 The plaintiff filed a lawsuit, claiming that the defendants
had violated the Sherman Act by creating a monopolistic contract
through collective bargaining among the members of the Guild.38
He sought enjoin the defendants both from proceeding with the
arbitration aimed at enforcing the Agreement and from interfering
with his production of the show.39 He also requested that royalties
be withheld pending assessment of damages." The district court
denied the plaintiffs motion for a temporary injunction, stating
that he did not present enough facts to show that the Agreement
was void under the Sherman Act.41
In his appeal to the Second Circuit, the plaintiff alleged that the
Agreement's provisions for compulsory arbitration and price
fixing, as well as the clause that forced producers to deal only with
Guild members, constituted restraints of trade. 2 The Second
Circuit held that the Agreement did constitute a restraint of trade.43
In doing so, the court rejected the Guild's contention that it was a
labor union that fell within the exception of Section 17 of the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Ring, 148 F.2d at 649.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ring, 148 F.2d at 649.
Id. at 650.
Id.
See supra note 6.
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Sherman Act." The court also emphasized that the plaintiff was
exactly the type of individual whom the Sherman Act sought to
protect.45 The court reversed the denial of the plaintiffs motion
for a temporary injunction and remanded the issue of damages
46
back to the district court.
On remand, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York found that just because the plaintiff had failed to prove any
measurable damages, it did not mean that he was unlikely to suffer
them in the future. 47 The court held that equitable relief was
appropriate, and that an injunction, lasting for a reasonable time,
would prevent the defendants from continuing to enforce the
Agreement and "employing the power of the conspiracy" with
respect to the play. 48 Essentially, both parties lost - the plaintiff
was left without rights in the play, and, if the defendants still
desired to license it to him, they would have to do so without the
Agreement and its restrictive provisions. 49 Both the plaintiff and
the Guild appealed to the Second Circuit - the plaintiff on the
dismissal of damages and the Guild as to the injunction."
In the second appeal, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of
the injunction. 1 The district court had specifically stated that
should the plaintiff wish to produce the play, and should the
authors still agree to license it to him, the authors could not offer
the plaintiff terms that were any less favorable than those offered
to any other producer.
The Second Circuit held that to be an
error, stating that once it was decided that plaintiff had no rights in

44. Ring, 148 F.2d at 651.
45. Id. at 653. ("[The] plaintiff is precisely the type of individual whom the
Sherman Act seeks to protect from combinations fashioned by others and
offered to such individual as the only feasible method by which he may do
business.")
46. Id. at 654.
47. Ring v. Spina, 84 F.Supp. 403, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). (Reasoning that the
monetary damages that the plaintiff for which the plaintiff asked were too
speculative as the show had not yet opened.)
48. Id. (referring to the illegal collusion of the Guild in restraint of trade.)
49. Id.
50. Ring, 186 F.3d 637.
51. Id at 642.
52. Id.
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the play, he was entitled neither to bid for a second production
contract nor to seek an injunction which would secure such a
right.53 According to the Second Circuit, if the Agreement was
repudiated for unlawfulness, it was repudiated in full; the plaintiff
could not keep the right to produce the play but excise the terms
the authors had conditioned upon their promise. 4 It also held that,
to support an injunction, a plaintiff must show a dangerous
probability that such injury will happen again.5 In this case, the
plaintiff was not a producer by trade, he was a lawyer. 6 He never
asserted that he would, especially after this experience, seek to
produce another play, or that now, after seven years, the authors
were likely to revive it. 7 In conclusion, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of monetary damages, but held the imposition of an
injunction to be error. 8
2. Bernstein v. UniversalPictures,Inc.
As discussed above, Section 17 of the Sherman Act, referred to
briefly in Ring, amended the antitrust laws, making them
inapplicable to labor organizations. 9 The labor exemption, as read
in conjunction with the NLRA, is applied only to labor unions
consisting of employees, and not independent contractors.6 °
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ring, 186 F.2d at 643.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2005).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2005). The general test that the
Supreme Court has used to define the term "employee" can be found in
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23 (1992): ". . . when
Congress has used the term 'employee' without defining it, we have concluded
that Congress intended to describe the . . . relationship as understood by
common-law agency doctrine .
The test for determining whether a hired
party is an employee is:
[W]e consider the hiring party's right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished. Among
other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the
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Bernstein v. Universal Pictures,Inc. and Julien v. Society of Stage
Directors and Choreographers, Inc., address the distinction
between employees and independent contractors with respect to
the entertainment industry.6'
In Bernstein, the Second Circuit, in an appeal from the Southern
District Court of New York, found evidence suggesting that movie
and television composers were not employees, but independent
contractors.6 2 The case involved a Minimum Basic Agreement63 ,
created by the Composers and Lyricists Guild of America
(hereinafter "CLGA"), and signed by several producers, some of
whom belonged to the Association of Motion Picture and
Television Producers (hereinafter "AMPTP").64 Here, unlike in
Ring, the CLGA argued that it was not a labor organization.6 5 The
allegations were further distinguished from Ring in that CLGA
was trying to prove collective bargaining by the producers in
violation of the Sherman Act.66 In doing so, CLGA attempted to
have the issue heard before a federal court rather than the National
Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB"), asserting that the
NLRB did not have jurisdiction because they were independent
contractors and not employees.67 The producers argued that the
subject matter was within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of

work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring parties have a right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
disretion over when and how long to work; the method of
payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
the employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired
party.
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(1958).
61. Bernstein, 517 F.2d 976; Julien, 1975 WL 957.
62. Bernstein, 517 F.2d at 980.
63. A standard form contract similar in nature to the Guild's Agreement.
64. Bernstein, 517 F.2d at 978.
65. Id. at 979.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id.
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the NLRB, and the district court agreed.68
The composers appealed to the Second Circuit. 69 They argued
that the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction depended on the status of
the composers as employees or independent contractors.7°
Referring to the NLRA, they argued that labor organizations are
collections of employees, a term whose definition excludes
independent contractors. Thus, the NLRB had no jurisdiction.
The district court decided that because the CLGA had acted as a
labor union for over twenty years, by electing bargaining
representatives and engaging in collective bargaining, it would
treat them as such. 72 The Second Circuit, however, found that did
not resolve the issue. It held that "antitrust jurisdiction cannot be
denied simply because independent contractors masquerade as a
union. 7 3 Instead, the Second Circuit applied the traditional tests74
for determining whether or not a party is an employee.75 It found
substantial evidence that the members of the CLGA were
independent contractors and not employees.76 It noted that
composers contract for a specific output, work at their own pace at
home, and are not subject to day-to-day supervision by the
producers. 7 The Second Circuit also stressed that the producer
had no right to control the manner in which work was performed.78
However, as the NLRB was already in the advanced stages of
proceedings on the matter, in the interest of efficiency and
predictability, the Second Circuit held that the official decision
should be left to the NLRB.79

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Bernstein, 517 F.2d at 979.
Id. at 980.
Id.
See supra note 60.

75. Bernstein, 517 F.2d at 980.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 982.
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3. Julien v. Society of Stage Directorsand Choreographers,Inc
In contrast to Bernstein, the Julien court found that stage
directors were employees and not independent contractors.80 In
this case, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
noted that while there are numerous tests for whether a party is an
independent contractor or an employee, "the general test is found
in an analysis of 'the nature and amount of control reserved by the
81
person for whom the work is done."'
In analyzing both Ring and Bernstein, the Julien court found a
sharp distinction between the status of playwrights and composers
and the status of directors in the same industry.82 A producer has a
great deal of control over the work that is done by stage director,
unlike the very limited amount of control a producer has over
playwrights.83 In dealing with directors, the producer may add or
delete scenes, attend auditions, select the cast, redesign sets,
choose costumes, determine the length of rehearsal time, and
decide locations of where the play will be performed.84 The
producer may do all of these things (and more) over the objections
of the director, as part of his control over the artistic direction of
the play.8" The court found that the producer had final control over
every aspect of the director's job and therefore held that stage
directors were employees.86
4. Barr v. DramatistsGuild, Inc.
In 1983, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York once again addressed a dispute over the Guild's Minimum

80. Julien v. Soc'y of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc., 1975 WL
957, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975).
81. Id. The Court is basically finding that, of all of the factors generally
applied to the traditional Supreme Court test (see note 60), this factor is the one
it finds to be the most compelling.
82. Id at *3.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Basic Production Contract ("MBPC"). 8 7 In Barr v. Dramatists
Guild, Inc., the plaintiff, president of the League of New York
Theaters and Producers, Inc. (hereinafter "League"), alleged that
there was a conspiracy stemming from the MBPC.88 He sought a
declaration that the alleged conspiracy was a violation of the
Sherman Act as well as an injunction against any such contracts.8 9
The complaint also sought to enjoin the defendants, the Guild,
from involving themselves in the negotiations between an author
and a producer of licensing terms.9" The defendants filed a
counterclaim alleging that it was the League which had violated
the Sherman Act by conspiring to fix the compensation received
by playwrights at an artificially low and non-competitive level.9 1
The sole issue before the court was the League's motion to
dismiss the counterclaim.9" In support of its counterclaim, the
Guild argued that if the court held that playwrights may not
combine to negotiate the terms and conditions of their
employment, then neither could the producers combine to
negotiate the terms on which they would deal with those
playwrights.9 3 The counterclaim alleged that two of the members
of the League controlled about seventy percent of the first-class
theaters and had a monopoly in New York City, thereby
dominating the League and dictating the terms under which they
would produce a playwright's work.94 In particular, the League
had used the same MBPC minimum terms, but had converted them
into maximum terms.9 5
The League argued that the Guild did not have standing to sue
under antitrust laws because it was an association and not a labor
union.96 After analyzing the federal statutes and case law, the
87. Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.
"MBPC" is essentially the same as the "Agreement" in Ring.
88. Id. at 557.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Idat 558.
92. Id. at 557.
93. Barr, 573 F.Supp. at 558.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 561.
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court rejected this argument. 97 It held that while associations may
not sue for treble damages stemming from antitrust violations, they
may sue for injunctive relief.9'
The Supreme Court has traditionally held that "an association
may bring an action on behalf of its members for injunctive relief
even when no injury to the association is alleged[.]"9 9 The Barr
court noted that in deciding whether an association has standing,
many courts have applied a test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.l"'
Under Hunt, an association has standing to seek injunctive relief if:
"(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit."'' The Guild satisfied all three elements."2 Thus, the
court denied the League's motion to dismiss the Guild's

counterclaim. 03
'
C. ComparativeLaw in the Medical Industry

In the medical industry, a similar battle has ensued over antitrust
issues and collective bargaining. Doctors have repeatedly sought
the enactment of federal legislation which would allow them to
collectively negotiate on contract terms with large hospitals and
large insurance plans such as HMOs. 1°4 While the United States

97. Id. at 558-563.
98. Id. at 561-562. The typical remedy in antitrust lawsuits is treble
damages. However, section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, does not
allow for such a remedy where the only injury alleged is to its members.
Instead, section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, allows injunctive relief
for such an injury.
99. Barr, 573 F.Supp. at 562 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511
(1975))
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing to Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
102. Id. at 563.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Congress has repeatedly proposed the Quality Heath-Care
Coalition Act (hereinafter "Health-Care Act") in response to the
doctors' pleas, the bill has yet to pass both the House and the
Senate." 5 A few states, however, have recently passed legislation
amending the antitrust laws in favor of these doctors.0 6 In
particular, Texas passed Senate Bill 1468 in 1999."°7 The law
allows groups comprising no more than ten percent of the
physicians within a health-benefit plan's service area to negotiate
contract terms and conditions with the health-benefit plan."'0 They
may only do so, however, where the benefits of joint negotiation
would outweigh the disadvantages from reduced competition.0 9
The policies behind this Texas law are very similar to those behind
the PLAI. Both protect collective bargaining by associations when
the threat of monopolistic behavior is outweighed and restrained
by an unequal amount of bargaining power.
Supporters of the Texas law asserted that the growth of managed
care gave health-benefit plans a great advantage over individual
physicians in their negotiations, creating contracts that were
severely unfavorable to the physicians."' They claimed that these
unfavorable provisions threatened patient care because doctors
were forced to either turn down health plans that dominated the
market or join an individual physicians association"' when they
would rather work on their own." 2 The supporters rebutted
opponents' claims that the legislation would raise the cost of
premiums at the expense of patients, stating that there was no hard

105. Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1998, H.R. 4277, 105th Cong. (2d
Sess. 1998); Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, H.R. 1304, 106th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2003, H.R. 1247,
108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2005, H.R.
3074, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
106. H.R. 4277; H.R. 1304; H.R. 1247; H.R. 3074.
107. S.B. 1468, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. H. Research Org. 1468, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999).
111. Individual physician's associations are exempted under antitrust laws
and allowed to bargain collectively. Id.
112. Id.
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evidence that joint negotiations would increase costs." 3 Instead,
the supporters pointed to an aging population, new medications,
and advances in medical technology as the major factors
contributing to higher medical costs." 4 The supporters' main
contention was that the new legislation would level the playing
field and was no more anticompetitive than the tactics previously
used by the plans." 5
Opponents of the bill argued that it would have anticompetitive
effects that would harm consumers."16 They also rebuked the bill
for its lack of research on physician joint negotiation, calling it
"foreboding in view of the huge impact that the bill would have on
health care in Texas.""1 7 The Texas legislature eventually passed
the bill, despite these objections." 8
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: THE PLAYWRIGHT
LICENSING ANTITRUST INITIATIVE ACT OF 2005
Since 2001, Representative Henry Hyde and Senator Orrin
Hatch have introduced several versions of the Playwright Antitrust
Initiative Act of 2005."' The bill would modify the application of
antitrust
laws to permit
collective development
and
implementation of a standard contract form for playwrights for the
licensing of their plays. 2 This would allow an association of
playwrights, namely the Dramatists Guild, to develop and utilize
their Minimum Basic Agreement or Minimum Basic Production
Contract, and thereby participate in the negotiations between
playwrights and producers concerning licensing agreements. The
Act has not yet been voted on, but as of 2005 it was still pending
in the House.' 2 ' It did, however, gather much support along the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Tex. H. Research Org. 1468.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 3.
120. H.R. 532.
121. Id. At the time of the submission of this article for publication (end of
2006 term), the PLAI had not been reintroduced to either the House or the
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way, and various other Representatives and Senators have added
22
their names as Cosponsors of the bill. 1
In April 2004, the Senate heard testimony on the proposed
legislation (then titled the Playwright Antitrust Initiative Act of
2004).123 Senator and Chairman Orrin Hatch opened the hearing
on the PLAI. 2 4 Afterward, the Senate Judiciary heard testimony
from such playwright heavyweights as Arthur Miller and Steven
Sondheim, as well as from the Guild and a prominent Broadway
producer. 25 The first three, along with Chairman Hatch, spoke in
26
support of the bill, while the producer spoke out against it.
A. Opening Statements of Chairman Orin Hatch
Chairman Hatch opened by asserting that the future of live
theater depended on maintaining the artistic independence of
dramatists and giving them a greater voice in licensing terms.'2 7
He went on to describe the nature of the proposed legislation:
Due to the interaction of federal labor, antitrust and
copyright law, the dramatists and their voluntary
peer organization, the Dramatists Guild of America,
have been hampered in acting collectively in their
dealings with highly organized and unionized
groups - such as actors, directors,
and
choreographers on the one hand - and the
increasingly consolidated producers and investors
on the other.2 8
Chairman Hatch explained that as a result of this interaction,
Senate in 2006.
122. H.R. 4615. Four co-sponsors, see supra note 3.
123. S. 2349.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Hearing Before Comm.
on S. Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. Orin Hatch, Chairman,
Comm. on S. Judiciary), 2004 WL 939485.
128. Id.
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playwrights, who are frequently at a substantial bargaining
disadvantage, are forced to accept contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. 29
'
He stated that for the next generation of American
playwrights to truly flourish, they needed a more organized
voice."0 He described the PLAI as "a narrow measure that would
allow playwrights . . . to act collectively in dealing with other
industry groups. . . .""' The Chairman further explained that, "it
would permit these artists to sit down with their creative
colleagues for the purpose of negotiating, adopting, and
implementing updated standard form terms."' 32 Chairman Hatch
also emphasized that the bill only covered collective adoption and
implementation, not collective enforcement.'33 He also stressed
that this measure would encourage young, struggling playwrights
to continue working in the industry.'34
B. Testimony ofArthur Miller
Arthur Miller, a critically acclaimed playwright, having written
such plays as Death of a Salesman and The Crucible, spoke on the
merits of the proposed legislation.'3 5 Miller noted that he was
speaking not on behalf of himself, but on behalf of up and coming
playwrights.' 36 He stressed that the American theater risks losing
the next generation of playwrights to other media as the pressures
on them increase and their power to protect their economic

interests diminishes. 137
In his testimony, Miller explained the benefit of the Act for
playwrights and the American theater itself:' 38

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Seesupra note 127.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Hearing Before Comm.
on S. Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Arthur Miller, Playwright),
2004 WL 939462.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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The American theater has undergone enormous
changes over the years. From its entrepreneurial
start it has become increasingly dominated by
corporate interests. Sure, business is changing in
virtually every sector of our economy, and there is
no reason that the theater should be immune from
business pressures. But, unfortunately, in the midst
of these increasing pressures, only one entity does
not have a seat at the bargaining table: the
playwrights. . . . [A]I1 other entities have the
collective power and ability to fight for their rights.
As a result, it is the playwright who gets squeezed..
[The PLAI] would provide a very limited
legislative fix that would allow for the standard
form contract.., to be updated to take account of
today's market realities and intellectual property
climate. It does not force producers to hire any
playwrights, but it does allow playwrights with a
willing producer to protect their economic and
39
artistic interests.1
Miller readily conceded that antitrust exemptions are difficult to
create, and asserted his belief that laws should not be too easily
amended; however, he urged that the national interest demanded
such a change.14
C. Testimony of Steven Sondheim
Steven Sondheim is a successful playwright and winner of a
Pulitzer Prize and several Tony awards. 4 ' He is also a former
President of the Guild and has worked for some time with
Congress to promote the PLAI.
In his testimony, Sondheim

139. Id.
140. See supra note 135.
141. Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Hearing Before Comm.
on S. Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Steven Sondheim,
Playwright), 2004 WL 939463 (Apr. 28, 2004).
142. Id.
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stated that the Guild is the only professional association for
playwrights, composers, and lyricists, and consists of more than
6,000 members. 4 3 He also acknowledged that the Guild is not a
union, and therefore did not come under the protections of the
NLRA, as the members do not meet the definition of "employee"
that would allow them to bargain collectively.'4 4 He went on to
note that case precedent has granted both choreographers and
scenic designers the exemptions necessary to allow them to
bargain collectively, and stressed his belief that playwrights should
be afforded that same opportunity.'45
Sondheim also injected personal experience into his testimony to
illustrate his position:
[O]ne show I wrote, "Merrily We Role Along," is a
piece that goes backwards in time. It starts at the
end of the story and . . . proceeds back to the
beginning. One producer tried to reverse the order
of the play because he believed it would be easier
for the audience to understand. Needless to say, it
did not improve matters, but even if it had, it was
not the show we had written or intended to be
presented. Because I was a recognized name in
theater and had a certain amount of what is known
as . . . clout ... I was able to protect the piece and
stop the production, thus preserving the integrity of
my intellectual property. Not every playwright is
so lucky. And it is partly due to the collective
ability of the Dramatists Guild that those rights can
be enforced. But under the outdated contract we
now have with theater producers, our ability to
negotiate realistically, based on current market
factors and realities, is limited.'4 6
Sondheim also stressed that the amount of support for this piece
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of legislation shows that it is not a partisan issue, and that the
marketplace where all
PLAI would help create a competitive
47
interests can be appropriately balanced.
D. Testimony of The DramatistsGuild ofAmerica
The Guild also submitted a statement at the hearing, explaining
that the Act was "surgically designed to correct a single anomaly

in the case law relating to playwrights ....

1"4'

The Guild declared

that as a result of related case law, it has operated under the
constant threat of the Sherman Act's application. 49 The Guild
declared that "the lack of clear direction provided by the Ring v.
Spina saga has been exacerbated by subsequent case law involving
other artists involved in the American theater."'' 0 The Guild
highlighted the distinctions between the stage directors, lyricists,
and choreographers in the Julien and Bernstein decisions and the
playwrights in Ring, with regard to employment status.' 5 ' The
Guild further discussed the legal implications of the new
legislation, noting that:
The legal framework for judging the propriety of
dramatists acting through their Guild in a
collaborative effort to reform a minimum standards
form agreement, is exceedingly complex and
arcane. It implicates the century old effort by our
legal system to reconcile and accommodate two
facially inconsistent national policies: labor and
antitrust. '
The Guild further stated that this accommodation/reconciliation
is a challenge in the abstract:
147. See supra note 141.
148. Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Hearing Before Comm.
on S. Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of the Dramatists Guild of
America, Association of Playwrights), 939483 (Apr. 28, 2004).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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[I]t is a daunting challenge in the unique
environment of the Broadway theater - itself part of
a unique industry, the entertainment industry. The
effort to categorize dramatists as common law
employees or independent contractors in the classic
analytic mode is a far different exercise than that
involving fishing boat captains. The Broadway
theater is not the . . . electric supply company.
53
"Death of a Salesman" is not a widget.
The Guild asserted that the legislation is not intended to resolve
the greater issues of labor and antitrust laws, but merely to resolve
5
a long history of problems in the American theater. 1
E. Testimony of Roger Berlind
Roger Berlind, the renowned producer of over forty plays on
Broadway (some written by Steven Sondheim) and many offBroadway and regional productions, opposes the PLAI. 55 Before
entering the industry, Berlind was an investment banker, and
therefore has a great deal of knowledge about investment risk.'56
He testified that, as he understood the proposed legislation, "the
playwrights seek to be free from the restraints of antitrust law, to
which the rest of us must adhere."' 5 7 He stressed that this would
not be good for competition or the theater, and would specifically
be harmful to young playwrights:
The essence of theatrical production is risk.
The risk/reward ratio is not enticing. The process
begins with the initial agreement to license the
rights to produce .... While [the purpose of the

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Hearing Before Comm.
on S. Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Roger Berlind, Producer),
2004 WL 939482 (Apr. 28, 2004).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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PLAI] sounds reasonable, in practice it just won't
work. The proposal assumes that there are two
positions - a producer position and a playwright
position - that can be stated for all time. [But]
there are way too many variables, and at least from
the perspective of the producers - we don't all
agree on structure, price or terms. Every show is
different, and we want the flexibility to negotiate
those things in each and every different context we
face.

158

Berlind asserted that "it's just a fact that one might not structure
the same agreement for a brand-new, never-before-produced play
by an unknown author as for one of the distinguished playwrights
sitting here."' 59 Berlind insisted, "[t]hat's not unfair; it's what
160
allows the unknown author to become known."'
Berlind stressed that if this proposed legislation were enacted
there would no longer be a free market in the industry, but rather a
closed one with the Guild acting as gatekeeper.' 6' That gatekeeper
role, he concluded, was the reason there were currently many more
productions of plays by non-Guild members than by members.161
IV. ANALYSIS
This Analysis will argue that the PLAI meets the underlying
policies behind copyright, labor, and antitrust laws, even when it is
in contradiction with the literal language of the applicable statutes.
Further, it will address and analyze the case precedent. Finally, it
will illustrate the similarities between the Health-Care Act and the
PLAI.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 155.
Id.
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A. The Dual Goals of Copyright Law: How the
IncidentalFacilitatesthe Most Important
There are two competing interests in Copyright law: protection
of the author's rights in her work and the public's rights to free
access of new materials.'63 The inherent public policy behind
copyright law, however, is public access. But are there really any
new ideas, or are there only new expressions of old ideas? The
Framers understood that expressive creations are beneficial to
society in that they promote the economic and social progress and
the development of nations. That is why Copyright law adheres to
the notion that new artistic concepts and designs are created from
the previous artistic concepts and designs of those before us.
While artists often possess passion for the subject of their work
and their primary goals may not be financial ones, the act of
creating, is still work nonetheless. Without financial incentives for
their creations, they may abandon their pursuit of the arts and turn
to other, more lucrative careers. Again, the Framers understood
this reality and therefore created the Copyright Clause as an
incentive for those scientists and artists. But ultimately, that
incentive was created as a means to the important end of assuring
that new creative works will eventually end up in the public
domain. This ensures eventual access to those specific creations,
giving new artists the opportunity to build off of existing ideas.
1. The PLAI Creates Incentives that Furtherthe Promotion of
Public Access
It could be argued that the PLAI will decrease public access by
deterring producers from investing in new plays or by the
possibility of increased ticket prices. The PLAI, however, will
provide an incentive to authors to create these works in the first
place. While public access is the most important objective of
copyright law, without these incentives there would be no works
for the public to access.
The PLAI specifically protects playwrights. Over the last fifty
years, American theater has taken a back seat to other mediums of
163. See supra note 8.
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expression, namely television and movie productions.'6 4 Without

the rights afforded by the PLAI, playwrights will (and have been)
turning to those other mediums; and not because they no longer
possess a passion for writing plays, but merely because the stage
lacks the financial incentives necessary to attract and keep them.'65
New playwrights face a particular hardship in that producers will
often take advantage of their willingness to accept almost any
terms just to have their work produced. The League's argument
that new playwrights will actually be harmed by the PLAI because
they will not have their plays produced at all is simply without
merit. Surely, no one presumes that it is the responsibility of

producers to protect the rights of young playwrights. In fact, it is
through the PLAI that playwrights choose to protect their own
rights. Whether there may be any truth to the League's argument
is speculative for now and will be answered by the market if the
PLAI should pass.
Certainly it makes more sense to give
playwrights the ability to protect themselves than to have
producers acting in a paternalistic fashion, especially when the

interests of the two parties, at least in regards to financial concerns,
are at odds.
Another possible argument against the PLAI is that the Guild is

actually the one acting in a paternalistic fashion, creating
incentives over and above those recognized by copyright policy.
This seems to be the function, however, of all associations.

Certainly it is the primary goal of an association to further the
interests of its members, as evidenced by the Supreme Court
decision allowing an association to bring suit on behalf of its
members.' 66 In addition, the Guild is only acting to protect those
incentives already advanced by copyright law, and not to extend
them further. If one accepts the argument that without the PLAI
playwrights will leave the field of live theater in search of other
opportunities, then the incentive created by the PLAI, and
therefore the Guild, is fundamental and quite basic.

164. See, e.g. supra note 134; supra note 137.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 98.
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B. Labor Law: Addressing the Inequalities that Burden
Commerce
The NLRA was enacted in response to a specific social and
economic problem. Congress recognized that the inequality in
bargaining power between employees and employers had the
effect of burdening the free flow of commerce. The statute's
language illustrates that the congressional intent was to ensure a
smooth flow of goods through the market. The full text of the
NLRA, however, lists some of the obstructions to commerce that
the PLAI was designed to prevent, one of which is "causing
diminution of employment and wages in such volume as to
substantially impair the flow or disrupt the market for goods
flowing from or into the channels of commerce."' 67
When
producers take advantage of young playwrights, causing those
playwrights to leave the field, those producers are, in essence,
impairing the flow (when they take advantage) or disrupting the
market for goods flowing (when their conduct causes playwrights
to leave the theater) into the channels of commerce. Even so, that
does not end the inquiry here; the question of whether playwrights
are employees, as defined and protected by the NLRA, still
remains.
1. Playwrights are Not Covered Under the LiteralLanguage of
the NLRA
When Congress uses the term "employee" without defining it,
the Supreme Court has indicated that it is referring to the commonlaw agency doctrine.' 6 8 Generally, a court will apply a thirteenfactor test to determine whether or not a party is an employee.' 69
The factors considered are: (1) the hiring party's right to control
the manner and means by which the product is accomplished; (2)
the skill required; (3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools;
(4) the location of the work; (5) the duration of the relationship
between the parties; (6) whether the hiring parties have a right to
167. 29 U.S.C. 151.
168. Supra note 59.
169. See id.
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assign additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the
hired parties' discretion over when and how long to work; (8) the
method of payment; (9) the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants; (10) whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; (11) whether the hiring party is in business; (12)
the provision of70 employee benefits; and (13) the tax treatment of
the hired party. 1
Here, the product at issue is the script. Applying the thirteenfactor test, an overwhelming majority of the factors demonstrate
that a playwright is not an employee of the producer. Namely: the
hiring party, the producer, has no control over the manner and
means by which the script is written or developed and does not
become involved until the script is complete; as the writing of a
script involves a great deal of imagination, specialized writing
abilities and talent, it is not the type of skill an employer usually
seeks out for daily work, but rather the type contracted for
independently; a playwright will use his own pen (or computer), as
well as his own workspace, to write his play; the duration of the
relationship between the producer and the playwright is very
limited and involves only the time it takes to produce the one play;
if the producer should wish to commission another play, a new
contract would have to be devised and therefore the producer does
not have the right to assign additional projects to the playwright;
because the relationship does not, in most instances, come into
existence until after the play is written, the playwright has
unfettered discretion over when and how long to work on writing
the play; the method of payment is governed by the licensing
agreement and not a traditional employer-employee salary
agreement; the playwright also has full discretion in the hiring of
assistants; the playwright receives no employee benefits from the
producer as traditional employees would; and, producers do not
take taxes out of the playwright's payment as a hiring party would
normally do for an employee.
These factors all demonstrate that a playwright is not an
employee of the producer, but rather an independent contractor.

170. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. 730, 751752. Supra note 60.
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2. However, The PLAI Acts to Address the Inequalities that
Burden Commerce
If a party is not an employee, is he still protected by the NLRA
and allowed to bargain collectively? Certainly not if the NLRA is
read literally. But the relationship here may still meet the inherent
purpose of the NLRA to ensure the smooth and uninterrupted flow
of commerce. Labor law is often seen as being at odds with
antitrust law. It seeks to promote equality of bargaining power by
allowing groups of employees to join together and bargain
collectively. In contrast, antitrust law discourages collective
bargaining in order to avoid monopolistic growth of power.
Nonetheless, these two areas of law can arguably be aligned. The
term "employee" can effectively work as a safeguard, keeping the
NLRA indirectly connected with antitrust policies which prohibit
collective bargaining. Hence, the two laws combine to provide
that only employees can lawfully engage in collective bargaining.
But if antitrust policies are not themselves violated by the PLAI,
then there is no need for that particular safeguard.
C. Antitrust Law: InterpretationandAnalysis

1. The LiteralLanguage
The PLAI would arguably be a violation the Sherman Act's
literal language. The Guild boasts that its membership consists of
virtually every playwright in America.17 When all the playwrights
in America gather together to negotiate the terms of the
Agreement, which is the only way a play may be licensed, they are
actually controlling the entire market of live theater scripts. That
is the very definition of a contract or conspiracy in restraint of
trade. Literal interpretation, however, is not the only avenue for
statutory interpretation.

171.

Ring, 148 F.2d 649.
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2. Policy Analysis
When a statute is unclear or ambiguous, a court may look to the
intent of Congress at the time the statute was created. The antitrust
laws are among the least precise statutes enacted by Congress and
its original goals are impossible to establish with certainty.'
There are many theories of antitrust law and dozens of ways to
explain why Congress adopted the Sherman Act and how it
intended it to be applied. This discussion of antitrust law and
policy will be confined only to those theories implicated by the
PLAI.
a. The PLAI Promotes Economic Efficiency
One of the theories embodied in the analysis of antitrust policy
is based on economic efficiency.'7 3 This theory is based on the
notion that monopolies cause increased prices and reduced
output.'74 When there are multiple sources of a particular good or
service, as opposed to just one, the quality and quantity of the
goods and fairness in price to consumers increases substantially
and the transactions become much more economically efficient.
While this theory factors in consumer welfare, it is essentially
based on the resulting economics and does not reflect a preference
of consumer wealth over monopolist wealth.'75
The PLAI would not be barred by the "economic efficiency"
theory. While it can be argued that the quality of the plays written
may be lowered by the PLAI because young playwrights would
lose some of the incentive to write a relatively "better" play in an
attempt to get a "better" licensing agreement, that argument is
speculative and flawed. As mentioned above, artists possess a
special passion for their work. The work itself is unlike most
goods. As the Guild stated during Senate testimony, "Death of a
Salesman is not a widget."' 76 The likelihood that the Agreement
172. Lande, supra note 21, at 81.
173. See id.; Shulman, supra note 19.
174. Lande, supra note 21, at 71.

175. Id. at 84.
176. See supra note 141.
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would compromise the integrity of a playwright's work is minimal
at best. The playwright's name will be on his work, and if he
wishes to be produced again, he will want to put forth his best
effort regardless of the Agreement. In addition, the PLAI would
not force producers to invest in a particular play; it only permits
the Agreement to stipulate the minimum terms for the licensing of
that play.
It could be argued that the quantity of plays being produced
would decrease and that ticket prices would increase, thereby
reducing consumer welfare. Again, those arguments would be
speculative and flawed. It is the Guild who is the main proponent
of this piece of legislation. Its members consist of America's
playwrights. Playwrights would be harmed if the quantity of plays
being produced decreased and ticket prices increased because
consumer attendance would surely decrease in response, slowing
the market on which their future income depends. The Guild has
been fighting for the PLAI in the economic interest of their
members for decades. It would be paternalistic to deny them the
benefits of this legislation simply because it could possibly harm
them, especially when the potential for gain is much greater. In
addition, the argument that ticket prices would be increased here as
well, because it is focused on a preference of consumer wealth
over monopolist wealth - a preference not embraced by economic
efficiency theorists, as mentioned above. Therefore, the PLAI
complies with the economic efficiency theory.
b. The PLAI Promotes Allocative Efficiency
Robert H. Lande, in an article in the Hastings Law Journal,
explains allocative efficiency well:
Monopoly pricing reduces the total amount of
wealth in society. Because monopolists produce
less than would be produced under competitive
conditions, some resources that would have been
used to make that monopoly product, will be
diverted for other purposes, ones that consumers
value demonstrably less. That misallocation of
resources diminishes the fulfillment of a society's
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needs, which in terms of what society values,
results in a reduction of society's total wealth. This
process is considered to be an "allocative
inefficiency."
Elimination of monopoly pricing
would ... increase society's wealth and, therefore,
increase consumer satisfaction.'7 7

Many argue that the concept of allocative inefficiency did not
exist at the time that the Sherman Act was created, and as such,
Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to correct it.'
Economists, nevertheless, often consider allocative efficiency to be
quite important and condemn monopolies for disrupting it.'79
The PLAI would not implicate allocative inefficiency. To create
such an inefficiency the PLAI would have to encourage
playwrights to write less plays, creating greater demand for the
few plays available, which would in turn allow them to forcibly
increase prices for the licensing rights of those plays. Clearly, that
is not the purpose of the PLAI or the Guild. In fact, the Guild
seeks to protect all American playwrights by creating incentives to
keep them in the field of live theater and the production of less
plays surely would not be beneficial in that sense. This leads to
the second reason that the PLAI does not implicate allocative
inefficiency - it does not cause resources to be diverted to other
purposes which are less desirable to consumers. This is actually
what the PLAI seeks to remedy. Without the PLAI, the resources
(playwrights' creativity and work product) would be diverted to
other media. Whether television and movies are less desirable to
general consumers than live theater is debatable but largely
irrelevant as the consumer being affected by the PLAI is not the
general public, but producers as a group. Thus, in effect, the PLAI
creates an allocative efficiency in the market, as opposed to the
typical monopolistic disruption of that efficiency.

177. Lande, supra note 21, at 72.
178. See, e.g., id. at 87; David P. Claiborne, The Perils of the CapperVolstead Act and it's Judicial Treatment: Agricultural Cooperation and
IntegratedFarmingOperations, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263,274 (2002).
179. Lande, supra note 21, at 73.
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c. The PLAI Does Not Result in Unfair Transfers of
Wealth
Yet another theory is that monopolies should be condemned
because they have enough market power to raise prices and
"unfairly" extract wealth from consumers and turn it into
monopoly profits. 8 ' The word "fair" and "unfair" are treated as
moral comparisons: Monopolies extort wealth from consumers, a
consequence that is morally unfair. From a morality perspective,
the PLAI is surely fair.
Because the PLAI concerns only the licensing Agreement, the
League is the targeted consumer base.' 8 ' This means the League is
the vantage point from which moral fairness is measured. The
analysis does not require that the League derive an extensive
benefit from the PLAI, but merely requires that they are treated
fairly with respect to wealth transfers. The League is currently a
monopoly power extracting wealth from the members of the Guild.
The PLAI puts the two organizations on equal footing with respect
to collective bargaining and contract negotiations, making it
morally fair.
Even setting aside the monopolistic tendencies of the League,
the PLAI is still fair and reasonable. It is a common presumption
that the average producer has a great deal more power than the
average playwright, as power, itself, is often presumed from
financial strength.
A producer, by the very nature of his
profession, is in a much stronger financial position than a
playwright; otherwise the playwright would forgo the producer
altogether and utilize his own finances to produce the play. If the
Guild is allowed to bargain collectively and develop a standard
form contract to protect the interests of the individual playwright, a
producer would thereby be prevented from taking advantage of his
own financial strengths. This would place the two parties on equal
footing with respect to bargaining power. Therefore, even on an
individual level, the Guild's Agreement acts to ensure that the
licensing process is morally fair.
180. Lande, supra note 21.
181. This is because producers (the members of the League) are the targeted
consumer base.
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The underlying goal of the PLAI is to preserve American theater
by ensuring that playwrights do not leave the field for more
lucrative opportunities. Therefore, it could also be argued that the
theater goers are actually the ultimate consumers here. Even when
analyzing transfers of wealth from the point of view that theater
goers are the consumer, an arguably incorrect vantage point, the
PLAI is morally fair. The emphasis here is on transfers of wealth
and therefore the focus in regard to moral fairness should depend
on the process - the transfer - and not simply the end result. As
just explained, the process that determined the price of licensing
the play to the producers was fair. Thus, in terms of this analysis,
the playwright is out of the picture now; the producer has licensed
the play and the fairness analysis now depends on the price
increase above and beyond the licensing costs. If the price of
tickets is only increased relative to the increase in cost to the
producer,'8 2 then that increase is inherently fair as the process it
was derived from was fair. For example, if a producer normally
purchases a licensing right to produce a play for $100 and sells
tickets for $120, there is a twenty percent increase.' 83 If, because
of the PLAI, that producer must now pay $200 to acquire that a
license, then a fair ticket price would be $240, also a twenty
percent increase. The $240 ticket price is a fair one because the
producer should still be able to keep the same profit margins.
However, if that producer now sells those tickets for $300, the
price is not a reflection of the increased licensing costs, but merely
a reflection of increased profits to the producer. In such a
situation, the price increase to consumers is not a result of the
PLAI. This demonstrates that, as long as the licensing process is
fair, any increase in price to the consumer would also be fair as far
as the PLAI is concerned.
3. The PLAI Also Furthersthe Non-EconomicPolicies ofAntitrust
Another major theory in antitrust analysis is based on noneconomic policies and is mostly focused on disparate bargaining
182. This includes profit percentage.
183. These dollar amounts were chosen for ease of example. Certainly there
are other costs of producing a play beyond simply the purchase of a license.
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positions. The issues addressed by this theory that are relevant to
this analysis include concerns that competitors be treated fairly,
concerns with the dispersion of economic and social power, and
the promotion of equal opportunity. 8 4 The PLAI furthers the goals
of this theory completely.
The main goal of the PLAI is addressing and correcting the
disparate bargaining power between producers and playwrights.
Producers are often very strong financially, and the League could
arguably be considered a monopoly in some respects.'8 5 On the
other hand, playwrights are often much weaker financially, in fact,
' 86
young playwrights may often be considered "starving artists."'
Also, as mentioned above, playwrights may often be so desperate
to get their play produced and seen by audiences, that they will
accept terms that are detrimental to their own interests.
It can be argued that the PLAI will result in unfair treatment of
playwrights as competitors. Young, unknown and inexperienced
playwrights may reap the benefit of getting their play licensed on
the same terms as a well-established and experienced playwright
would. Meanwhile, the well-established and experienced producer
would be harmed in that he receives no additional benefit for his
years of work and reputation. The PLAI, in practice, would not
actually have this effect. The experienced playwright could (and
most likely would) still demand even more advantageous terms
than what is included in the Agreement. The PLAI merely ensures
that the unknown playwrights are not taken advantage of and are
treated "fairly" and with respect for the work they have done. In
that same way, the PLAI promotes equal opportunity. Without it,
a young playwright, disenchanted and disenfranchised, will likely
turn to other, more lucrative, opportunities in different media.
With the PLAI, that young playwright has the same opportunity to
enter the market as the experienced playwright has to stay in it.
Thus, overall, the PLAI furthers the non-economic policies of
antitrust.
The antitrust laws are quite convoluted and ambiguous, and
184. Shulman, supra note 19 (noting a few of the non-economic concerns
addressed by antitrust law).
185. See supra note 93.
186. Common clich6.
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therefore congressional intent should be utilized to interpret them.
The PLAI is in accord with the policies underlying antitrust law. It
is economically and allocatively efficient, in compliance with noneconomic concerns, and does not unfairly transfer wealth from the
consumer to the Guild.
D. Case Precedents: The PLAI Will Have Positive Effects

1. The Ring Case Demonstrates that the PLAI Would Promote
Equal Opportunity While Avoiding PaternalisticDecisions by the
Judiciary
The Ring court held that the Guild's Agreement violated the
Sherman Act because the Guild was not a labor organization. 8 In
the end, however, the court refused the plaintiff any relief,
monetary or equitable.' 88 Arguably, this is because the Agreement
actually represented what the parties would have bargained for
individually had they possessed equal bargaining power. If
producers were not more powerful than playwrights, the
playwrights here would have insisted upon the same terms as those
embodied in the Agreement. If trade was in fact restrained
unfairly, as was decided in the beginning of the Ring case, then
certainly the plaintiff would have suffered, or would likely suffer
in the future (as was held by the district court) and would be
entitled to relief.
To allow the plaintiff to modify the contract that he originally
bargained for would be overly protective. It would be ridiculous
to allow modification of contracts simply because the end result
was unfavorable to one of the parties; that risk is inherent in all
contracts. The plaintiff should have used better business judgment
in his dealings with the defendant. When the plaintiff took over
the other producer's rights in the play, he should have done more
preparatory research. The Guild's members consisted of virtually

187. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 650 (2d Cir. 1945)
188. Ring v. Author's League of America, Inc. 186 F.2d 637, 643 (2d Cir.
1951).
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all of the playwrights in America,'89 and therefore, every producer
deals with them in the regular course of business - a fact that
surely the plaintiff was aware of, or should have been. If he had
read the play first and prepared a plan of action, he would have
known from the beginning that he might want to make changes to
it. If the changes he wanted to make were essential to his
production, he should never have signed the restrictive Agreement.
As he did sign, he must abide by it, for it is exactly what he
bargained for at the time he entered the Agreement. Courts are
reluctant to modify a contract when the terms represent what the
parties had in mind at the time the contract was formed.
The PLAI would have kept this issue from ever coming before
the court. If the antitrust laws were amended to allow collective
bargaining by the Guild, the playwrights' interests here would
have been recognized by the Agreement. In addition, the producer
would not have been able to ask the court to change the Agreement
simply because he was unhappy with its results.
2. The Bernstein Case Demonstrate that Collective Bargainingby
Independent Contractorscan Sometimes Satisfy the Basic
Objectives of Labor Law

There is a direct correlation between the "employee" analysis of
playwrights and that of the composers in Bernstein,9 ' which
demonstrates that playwrights are independent contractors and not
employees. Similarly, the Julien court specifically noted the
distinction between stage directors and playwrights in its
determination that the directors were in fact employees. 9' The
relationship between the Guild and the League, however, still
meets the underlying purpose of the NLRA to ensure the smooth
and uninterrupted flow of commerce. Also, the term "employee"
effectively works as a safeguard by keeping the NLRA indirectly
connected with antitrust policies which prohibit collective
bargaining. If antitrust policies are not themselves violated by the
189. Ring, 148 F.2d at 649.
190. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975)
191. Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc., 1975 WL
957 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975).
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PLAI, then there is no need for this safeguard.
It is also important to note that while the Bernstein court found
that composers were likely to be classified as independent
contractors, they still allowed the issue to be resolved by the
NLRB. When read literally, the NLRA would only allow such an
issue to be brought before it by a class of employees, and not by
independent contractors. Nevertheless, as the NLRB had already
begun hearing the matter, the court agreed to let it make a
determination. If such a proceeding, as brought by independent
contractors, was completely at odds with the policies behind labor
law, the court should not have allowed the NLRB to continue with
the case. The fact that it did leads to the conclusion that
protection/punishment of independent contractors is not to be
absolutely distinguished from the policies underlying the NLRA.
3. The Barr Case Demonstrates that the PLAI Promotes Equality
and that Attitudes are Changing

One of the arguments presented by the Guild in Barrwas that if
playwrights cannot combine as a group to bargain collectively,
then producers may not do so either.'92 This is certainly true as
supported by the overall objectives of equality embedded in the
policies of labor and antitrust law. The Guild's licensing
Agreement also strengthens the objective of copyright law by
providing incentives to playwrights.
This case, in effect, foreshadowed the introduction of the PLAI.
The court recognized the Guild's right to bring a lawsuit on behalf
of its members. The lawsuit itself was centered around work
activities and product. Surely, an association whose sole purpose
is to protect the work activities and product of its members is very
similar, if not identical, to a labor organization. That purpose does
not change merely because its members are classified as
independent contractors rather than employees. The Bernstein
court refused to treat composers as employees merely because
their association "masquerades" as a labor union,'93 however, the
Barr court seems to be moving slowly in that direction.
192. Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 555, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
193. Julien, 1975 WL at *2.
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All three cases demonstrate that the PLAI promotes equal
opportunity.
The PLAI would also reduce requests for
paternalistic contract modification by judges. In addition, the
PLAI signifies a change in labor law analysis, which is shifting
very slowly to include protections for independent contractors as
well as employees.
E. Taking Your Doctor's: A PrescriptionForPassage
There are great similarities between the struggles of doctors and
those of playwrights.
Doctors, like playwrights, would be
considered independent contractors under the Supreme Court
test. 94
When analyzing the factors discussed earlier for
determining whether there is an employer-employee relationship,
it is apparent that: the HMO has no control over the manner and
means by which the doctor performs his work; the skill required
for medical treatment is highly specialized; the HMO does not
provide the doctors tools or equipment; the HMO cannot assign
projects to the doctors at all (let alone "additional projects" as the
test requires); the HMO has no discretion over when and how long
the doctor may work; the method of payment is not one that is
salaried or hourly; the HMO has no discretion over hiring
assistants, this is left fully to the discretion of the doctor; the
regular business of an HMO is health insurance and not health
care, itself; the HMO provides the doctor no employee benefits;
and certainly the HMO does not take taxes out of the doctors
payments. These factors all support the argument that a doctor is
an independent contractor and not an employee of an HMO.
One of the more interesting similarities between the Health-Care
Act and the PLAI is its reception in the legislature. When the
Health-Care Act was introduced in the US Congress, it received
the same treatment as the PLA.' 95 It is reintroduced each year,
and no action has been taken.'96 In contrast with the PLAI, Texas
has passed state legislation on a similar version of the Health-Care

194. See supra note 60 for "traditional test."
195. See supra note 105.

196. Id.
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Act. 97 This is an important point as the Heath-Care Act seems to
have more opponents than the generally supported PLAI. Taking
that into consideration, proponents of the PLAI should begin
lobbying in state legislatures. Federal antitrust laws are incredibly
broad and cover all industries. The plight of playwrights may be
an esoteric one in relation to the entire country. However,
individual states have more specific concerns than the federal
government. Many states have niche areas, such as entertainment,
which produce a good amount of revenue for that state.' 98 As such,
the chances of the Guild succeeding in amending a state's antitrust
laws are arguably greater than its chances of amending the federal
antitrust laws, as demonstrated by Texas Senate Bill 1468. The
goals served by the PLAI may be recognized more clearly in
particular states where the constituency is more interested in their
promotion.
V. WHERE DOES THE GUILD GO FROM HERE?

A. Emphasize Policy: The PLAI's Promotion of a Basic Good

The PLAI has been introduced into both the House and the
Senate repeatedly, and yet it has not been put to a vote.
Obviously, the Guild must take greater steps to demonstrate the
positive effects and necessity of the bill. One suggestion would be
to place emphasis on the basic policies served by the laws.
Congress does not amend laws easily, and for good reason: there
are specific policies promoted by the creation of a law, and
assuming that the standards of society have not evolved in such a
way to make that law unnecessary, it should remain unchanged
and not be tampered with. But the PLAI actually enhances the
policies behind the laws it implicates. Copyright law, labor law,
and antitrust law all promote a basic good, which is centered on
the notion of equal opportunity and advancement for both the
public/consumer and the creator/worker. It would be very
beneficial for the Guild to focus its arguments on that notion and
197. See supra note 107.
198. For example: California, New York, Virginia.
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how it is furthered by the PLAI.
B. The Importance of Entertainment: Lobbying the States May
Prove Persuasive
The Guild should take a cue from the medical industry, and try
lobbying state legislatures for a similar bill. There are various
states which focus more on entertainment issues than others California, New York, and Virginia, to name a few. The Guild
should focus on these states initially to get the PLAI passed in the
state levels of government, as opposed to - or at least in addition to
- the federal government.
Antitrust law encompasses many facets of commerce and trade.
Its scope ranges from state issues to interstate commerce, and even
progresses further on the continuum to issues involving
international commerce. As mentioned above, the PLAI covers
rather specific concerns, and may not be considered an imperative
amendment to a federal legislature that has such a wide-range of
pressing issues to address. But to a state whose revenues are
generated extensively from entertainment-related ventures, it may
indeed be such a pressing issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The PLAI would effectively meet the policies behind copyright
law, labor law, and antirust law. It would enhance the policies of
copyright law by providing an incentive for experienced
playwrights to remain in, and young playwrights to enter into, live
theater. This would act to increase the creative works produced
and eventually (after copyright protection expires) disseminated
into the public domain. In effect, the PLAI, like all copyright
protections, ensures America's progress and development, both
socially and economically.
The PLAI would also satisfy the basic objectives of labor law in
that it would ensure the smooth and uninterrupted flow of goods
and services through commerce. While playwrights may not meet
the traditional definition of "employee," and therefore do not fall
within the literal language of the NLRA, the PLAI would act to
further the policies of the NLRA by correcting the disparity in
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bargaining power between playwrights and producers. It would
help to ensure that playwrights will not be taken advantage of by
producers and consequently choose to leave the theater for other
media opportunities. The NLRA's literal language aims to correct
disparities in bargaining power between employers and employees
and the PLAI is in conformity with that language. The term
"employee" effectively works as a safeguard, keeping the NLRA
indirectly connected with antitrust policies which prohibit
collective bargaining. If antitrust policies are not themselves
violated by the PLAI, then there is no need for this safeguard.
In addition, antitrust policy does not bar the PLAI, despite the
literal language of the Sherman Act. Because the antitrust laws are
imprecise, Congressional intent may be used to determine its
meaning. In examining various theories of antitrust, the PLAI is in
accord with policy concerns of economic and allocative efficiency,
non-economic policy concerns, and unfair transfer of wealth.
Specifically, the PLAI would not be economically inefficient
because it would not decrease either the quality or quantity of
plays written. In addition, it would not create an allocative
inefficiency in the market because it would not serve to diminish
the amount of plays written or divert the resources of playwrights
into less desirable arenas. It also satisfies the non-economic
concerns because it would act to ensure that competitors are
treated fairly and promotes equal opportunity. Lastly, it does not
unfairly transfer wealth from the producers into the monopolistic
hands of the playwrights. The focus on equal opportunity is
essential in all three of these areas of law. It resides deep in the
dual goals of copyright law, is greatly advanced by the policies of
the NLRA, and is enshrined in the various theories behind antitrust
law.
The PLAI would also act to resolve the troubles discussed in the
cases here.19 9 Amending the antitrust laws to allow playwrights to

bargain collectively in negotiating the terms of their licensing
agreements would align the literal language of the applicable
statutes with their underlying policies, eliminating the unresolved
problems in these cases.
199. Bernstein, 517 F.2d 976; Ring, 148 F.2d 647; Julien, 1975 WL 957;
Barr, 573 F. Supp. 555.
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As comparably demonstrated by the Texas Health-Care Act, the
Guild should lobby state legislatures. This issue may be too
specific and not relevant to the nation as a whole, especially in
light of all the very serious antitrust issues of the day (both
international and national). Nevertheless, certain entertainmentfocused states are highly affected by this issue, as evidenced by
case precedent which demonstrates that this issue is mostly
litigated in New York courts.2"0 While the Health-Care Act has yet
to pass in the United States Congress, it has passed in state
legislatures, and the PLAI may, too. Unlike the Health-Care Act,
there is not much opposition to the PLAI, and it may have an even
greater chance of passing in individual state legislatures than the
Health-Care Act.
Based on the above assertions, the PLAI is a positive piece of
legislation that is in accord with the laws of the United States.
While there is no substantive reason for it not to pass, it may
simply fade away because it is so narrowly drawn and applies only
to playwrights. The Guild's best alternative would be to lobby
some of the state legislatures for similar enactments, while
continuing to stress the important policy objectives in the federal
branch of the legislature.

200. See id.
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